Fall 2014 Talk Series
9/19/2014 - Andrew Monroe Ph.D. (Brown). Post-doc, Psychology (Baumeister Lab), Florida State University
Not so motivated after all? Taking a closer look at the process of blame
Abstract: Over the past 20 years, moral judgment has typically been described as a motivated process wherein people’s intuitive desire to blame biases information processing and results in a tendency to over-blame. Yet, such a process of blame would be largely maladaptive and incongruent with using blame for everyday social-regulation. By examining how people update moral judgments in response to new information, I contrast the motivated-blame account with a systematic-blame hypothesis. I present new data showing that people carefully attend to causal and mental state information – regardless of its mitigating or exacerbating content – when making and updating blame judgments. This pattern of data sharply contrasts with the motivated blame account, favoring instead the systematic-blame hypothesis. These effects persist across different stimuli modalities, population groups, and are robust against bottom up effects (e.g., cognitive load). While systematic blame best captures everyday moral judgment, I discuss several new studies that highlight potential limits to systematic blaming, including: judging different moral tribes, the influence of emotion, power altering the social expression of blame, and moral beliefs biasing ascriptions of mind.
10/3/2014 -Nadia Chernyak Ph.D (Cornell). Post-doc, Brown University (Sobel Lab) & Harvard Graduate School of Education
Learning through doing: Children's learning about morality through choice
Abstract: Choice is critical for a variety of positive developmental outcomes, including self-esteem, well-being, and intrinsic motivation. The intuition that our actions are freely chosen is also important for our causal reasoning and our moral evaluations of others. In this talk I explore the interplay between young children’s concepts of choice and their emerging morality. I’ll first discuss whether young children reflect on their own actions as freely chosen. I’ll then turn to developmental and cultural variations in our concepts of choice. Finally, I’ll discuss 1) how (and why) choice serves as a mechanism that encourages internal motivation, and how it might influence prosocial behavior in early childhood, and 2) whether choice might be a domain-general way of learning about ourselves and others.
10/10/2014 - Rose McDermott Ph.D (Stanford). Professor of International Relations, Brown University
Revenge and Deterrence in International Relations
Abstract available upon request.
Professor McDermott is the author of three books, a co-editor of two additional volumes, and author of over ninety academic articles across a wide variety of disciplines encompassing topics such as experimentation, emotion and decision making, and the biological and genetic bases of political behavior.
10/17/2014 - Chris Baker Ph.D. MIT (Computational Cognitive Science Group)
Bayesian Theory of Mind: Modeling Attribution of Beliefs, Desires, Percepts, and Emotions
Abstract: At the heart of human social cognition is the capacity for mentalizing or ``theory of mind’’ (ToM): inferring others' mental states -- what they think, what they want, what they see, what they intend to do and are likely to be feeling -- based on observing their past actions, and in the service of predicting their future actions. I will present a Bayesian framework for understanding the mental representations and reasoning mechanisms of ToM, along with several psychophysical experiments testing the capacity of the framework to predict people’s quantitative attributions of beliefs, desires, percepts, and emotions to others. The framework formalizes people's causal theory of how agents’ beliefs, desires and situation produce behavior and expressions of emotion in terms of rational planning over partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs). Social reasoning is cast as Bayesian inference over POMDP models of intentional action, reconstructing the mental states that give rise to behavior. Across our experiments, the Bayesian framework predicts human social inferences substantially better than simpler variants or alternative models based on statistical analysis of perceptual features.
10/24/2014 - Jennifer Prewitt-Freilino Ph.D (Oklahoma). RISD.
Conveying and Reproducing Gender Hierarchies through Language
Abstract: Despite sensationalized media reports that claim women may soon be surpassing men in terms of wealth, power, and status, data from around the world demonstrate a clear and persistent gap between men and women. Clearly, many factors contribute to this gap and there are divergent theories that attempt to explain how differences in men and women emerge and persist. This presentation will focus on the relationship between gender inequality and language, highlighting the potential of language to shape gender hierarchies. I will present research in which I examined at the relationship between the grammatical gender of dominant languages used within a country and indices of gender equality, demonstrating that countries with gendered languages demonstrate lower levels of gender equality. I will also present some of my more recent work on the use of first person pronouns as a gendered marker of status. Discussion will focus on how subtle, seemingly mundane aspects of language may ultimately shape notions of power and status.
11/7/2014 - Nina Mazar Ph.D (Johannes Gutenberg-University. Professor of Marketing, University of Toronto
Pain of Paying — A Metaphor Gone Literal: Evidence from Neurobiology and Behavioral Decision Making
Abstract: How do individuals perceive paying for goods? Standard economic theories assume an analytical process in which consumers consider the opportunity costs of the purchase. However, recent behavioral economic theories of purchases suggest an additional, hedonic process underlying the act of paying—that is, that individuals also experience an immediate displeasure of paying. We investigated this idea in three incentive-compatible experiments. First, we conducted a brain imaging study, which suggested that there exists a displeasure of paying akin to a higher-order, affective pain. Building on this result, we next facilitated the perception of affective pain through conceptual priming, which decreased subjects’ willingness to pay (WTP). Finally, misattributions of pain perception to placebo drugs increased versus decreased subjects’ WTP in case of affective pain enhancers versus pain relievers, respectively. In contrast, manipulations of somatosensory pain perception did not alter the WTP in the latter two experiments. Thus, the “pain of paying” is not just a metaphor or a mere analytical process as standard economic theories suggest; it is an actual affective experience..
11/14/2014 - Joachim Krueger Ph.D (Oregon). Professor, Brown University
Let me help you help me: Trust between profit and prosociality
Abstract: Interpersonal trust is a quintessential social dilemma. The trusting person creates a social good, while accepting the vulnerability of being exploited by selfish individuals. I review the basic psychology of three social games as they relate to trust: the dictator game, which captures the situation of the trustee, on whom trustors depend; the assurance game, which represents a situation of mutual trust and trustworthiness; and the trust game proper, which is played sequentially, and which thereby accentuates the trustor’s vulnerability. My main points are: [1] trust comprises closely intertwined personal motives of seeking profit, social preferences (e.g., benevolence), and social sensitivity (e.g., theory of mind and mind-reading). [2] Social preferences alone are insufficient for an explanation of individual trust and of the eventual distribution of wealth in a group or society.
12/12/2014 - Dan Kahan, J.D. (Harvard Law). Professor of Law and Psychology, Yale Law School
How does identity-protective cognition interact with effortful (System 2) information processing? And how about with professional judgment?
Abstract: I will invite critical engagement with data (some from published articles, some from gestating papers, some from studies in still in utero) aimed at situating identity-protective cognition in relation to other information-processing dynamics. By “identity –protective cognition,” I refer to the tendency of people to unconsciously assimilate all manner of information (sensory impressions, source credibility, logical inferences from data) to beliefs associated with membership in some affinity group; it is the species of motivated reasoning understood to account for politically biased assessments of evidence on contested issues such as climate change and gun control (Sherman & Cohen, Advances in Exp. Pysch. 38: 183-242, 2006). The data I will present suggest that, contrary to common surmise, identity-protective cognition is not a consequence of over-reliance on heuristic information processing; on the contrary, experimental results suggest that proficiency in effortful information processing magnifies the impact of identity-protective cognition. I will also present new data on the interaction between identity-protective cognition and professional judgment—of the sort exercised by lawyers and judges—both in and out of domain.
Not so motivated after all? Taking a closer look at the process of blame
Abstract: Over the past 20 years, moral judgment has typically been described as a motivated process wherein people’s intuitive desire to blame biases information processing and results in a tendency to over-blame. Yet, such a process of blame would be largely maladaptive and incongruent with using blame for everyday social-regulation. By examining how people update moral judgments in response to new information, I contrast the motivated-blame account with a systematic-blame hypothesis. I present new data showing that people carefully attend to causal and mental state information – regardless of its mitigating or exacerbating content – when making and updating blame judgments. This pattern of data sharply contrasts with the motivated blame account, favoring instead the systematic-blame hypothesis. These effects persist across different stimuli modalities, population groups, and are robust against bottom up effects (e.g., cognitive load). While systematic blame best captures everyday moral judgment, I discuss several new studies that highlight potential limits to systematic blaming, including: judging different moral tribes, the influence of emotion, power altering the social expression of blame, and moral beliefs biasing ascriptions of mind.
10/3/2014 -Nadia Chernyak Ph.D (Cornell). Post-doc, Brown University (Sobel Lab) & Harvard Graduate School of Education
Learning through doing: Children's learning about morality through choice
Abstract: Choice is critical for a variety of positive developmental outcomes, including self-esteem, well-being, and intrinsic motivation. The intuition that our actions are freely chosen is also important for our causal reasoning and our moral evaluations of others. In this talk I explore the interplay between young children’s concepts of choice and their emerging morality. I’ll first discuss whether young children reflect on their own actions as freely chosen. I’ll then turn to developmental and cultural variations in our concepts of choice. Finally, I’ll discuss 1) how (and why) choice serves as a mechanism that encourages internal motivation, and how it might influence prosocial behavior in early childhood, and 2) whether choice might be a domain-general way of learning about ourselves and others.
10/10/2014 - Rose McDermott Ph.D (Stanford). Professor of International Relations, Brown University
Revenge and Deterrence in International Relations
Abstract available upon request.
Professor McDermott is the author of three books, a co-editor of two additional volumes, and author of over ninety academic articles across a wide variety of disciplines encompassing topics such as experimentation, emotion and decision making, and the biological and genetic bases of political behavior.
10/17/2014 - Chris Baker Ph.D. MIT (Computational Cognitive Science Group)
Bayesian Theory of Mind: Modeling Attribution of Beliefs, Desires, Percepts, and Emotions
Abstract: At the heart of human social cognition is the capacity for mentalizing or ``theory of mind’’ (ToM): inferring others' mental states -- what they think, what they want, what they see, what they intend to do and are likely to be feeling -- based on observing their past actions, and in the service of predicting their future actions. I will present a Bayesian framework for understanding the mental representations and reasoning mechanisms of ToM, along with several psychophysical experiments testing the capacity of the framework to predict people’s quantitative attributions of beliefs, desires, percepts, and emotions to others. The framework formalizes people's causal theory of how agents’ beliefs, desires and situation produce behavior and expressions of emotion in terms of rational planning over partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs). Social reasoning is cast as Bayesian inference over POMDP models of intentional action, reconstructing the mental states that give rise to behavior. Across our experiments, the Bayesian framework predicts human social inferences substantially better than simpler variants or alternative models based on statistical analysis of perceptual features.
10/24/2014 - Jennifer Prewitt-Freilino Ph.D (Oklahoma). RISD.
Conveying and Reproducing Gender Hierarchies through Language
Abstract: Despite sensationalized media reports that claim women may soon be surpassing men in terms of wealth, power, and status, data from around the world demonstrate a clear and persistent gap between men and women. Clearly, many factors contribute to this gap and there are divergent theories that attempt to explain how differences in men and women emerge and persist. This presentation will focus on the relationship between gender inequality and language, highlighting the potential of language to shape gender hierarchies. I will present research in which I examined at the relationship between the grammatical gender of dominant languages used within a country and indices of gender equality, demonstrating that countries with gendered languages demonstrate lower levels of gender equality. I will also present some of my more recent work on the use of first person pronouns as a gendered marker of status. Discussion will focus on how subtle, seemingly mundane aspects of language may ultimately shape notions of power and status.
11/7/2014 - Nina Mazar Ph.D (Johannes Gutenberg-University. Professor of Marketing, University of Toronto
Pain of Paying — A Metaphor Gone Literal: Evidence from Neurobiology and Behavioral Decision Making
Abstract: How do individuals perceive paying for goods? Standard economic theories assume an analytical process in which consumers consider the opportunity costs of the purchase. However, recent behavioral economic theories of purchases suggest an additional, hedonic process underlying the act of paying—that is, that individuals also experience an immediate displeasure of paying. We investigated this idea in three incentive-compatible experiments. First, we conducted a brain imaging study, which suggested that there exists a displeasure of paying akin to a higher-order, affective pain. Building on this result, we next facilitated the perception of affective pain through conceptual priming, which decreased subjects’ willingness to pay (WTP). Finally, misattributions of pain perception to placebo drugs increased versus decreased subjects’ WTP in case of affective pain enhancers versus pain relievers, respectively. In contrast, manipulations of somatosensory pain perception did not alter the WTP in the latter two experiments. Thus, the “pain of paying” is not just a metaphor or a mere analytical process as standard economic theories suggest; it is an actual affective experience..
11/14/2014 - Joachim Krueger Ph.D (Oregon). Professor, Brown University
Let me help you help me: Trust between profit and prosociality
Abstract: Interpersonal trust is a quintessential social dilemma. The trusting person creates a social good, while accepting the vulnerability of being exploited by selfish individuals. I review the basic psychology of three social games as they relate to trust: the dictator game, which captures the situation of the trustee, on whom trustors depend; the assurance game, which represents a situation of mutual trust and trustworthiness; and the trust game proper, which is played sequentially, and which thereby accentuates the trustor’s vulnerability. My main points are: [1] trust comprises closely intertwined personal motives of seeking profit, social preferences (e.g., benevolence), and social sensitivity (e.g., theory of mind and mind-reading). [2] Social preferences alone are insufficient for an explanation of individual trust and of the eventual distribution of wealth in a group or society.
12/12/2014 - Dan Kahan, J.D. (Harvard Law). Professor of Law and Psychology, Yale Law School
How does identity-protective cognition interact with effortful (System 2) information processing? And how about with professional judgment?
Abstract: I will invite critical engagement with data (some from published articles, some from gestating papers, some from studies in still in utero) aimed at situating identity-protective cognition in relation to other information-processing dynamics. By “identity –protective cognition,” I refer to the tendency of people to unconsciously assimilate all manner of information (sensory impressions, source credibility, logical inferences from data) to beliefs associated with membership in some affinity group; it is the species of motivated reasoning understood to account for politically biased assessments of evidence on contested issues such as climate change and gun control (Sherman & Cohen, Advances in Exp. Pysch. 38: 183-242, 2006). The data I will present suggest that, contrary to common surmise, identity-protective cognition is not a consequence of over-reliance on heuristic information processing; on the contrary, experimental results suggest that proficiency in effortful information processing magnifies the impact of identity-protective cognition. I will also present new data on the interaction between identity-protective cognition and professional judgment—of the sort exercised by lawyers and judges—both in and out of domain.
Spring 2015 Talk Series
3/31/2015 - Justin Martin (PhD Student, Harvard).
The function of punishment: Insights from underlying processes and contextual influences
Abstract: Explaining human punishment is difficult. Despite playing a role in motivating cooperation, punishment is costly for both punisher and victim. And, we punish not only as harmed second-parties but also as impartial third-parties, when benefits from punishment are diminished. Further, punishment itself appears to be a unique judgment, distinct from other moral and social judgments in the factors it is sensitive to. In this talk, I will present work suggesting that new insight into punishment can be gained by focusing on the cognitive processes and motivations underlying punitive behavior. I will present data suggesting that punishment is supported by distinct cognitive mechanisms, relative to other forms of behavior. Further, these mechanisms are sensitive to factors that influence whether punishment can change the target's behavior, suggesting a pedagogical role for punishment. Finally, I will present data showing that the motivations underlying punishment change across contexts - specifically, whether one is a second- or third-party punisher. Together, these results suggest that one way of understanding punishment is through focusing on the cognitive processes and motivations underlying it.
The function of punishment: Insights from underlying processes and contextual influences
Abstract: Explaining human punishment is difficult. Despite playing a role in motivating cooperation, punishment is costly for both punisher and victim. And, we punish not only as harmed second-parties but also as impartial third-parties, when benefits from punishment are diminished. Further, punishment itself appears to be a unique judgment, distinct from other moral and social judgments in the factors it is sensitive to. In this talk, I will present work suggesting that new insight into punishment can be gained by focusing on the cognitive processes and motivations underlying punitive behavior. I will present data suggesting that punishment is supported by distinct cognitive mechanisms, relative to other forms of behavior. Further, these mechanisms are sensitive to factors that influence whether punishment can change the target's behavior, suggesting a pedagogical role for punishment. Finally, I will present data showing that the motivations underlying punishment change across contexts - specifically, whether one is a second- or third-party punisher. Together, these results suggest that one way of understanding punishment is through focusing on the cognitive processes and motivations underlying it.